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Bill of Rights itself, all lend credence to the view that the discretion
accorded these officials is to be restricted, perhaps not within the
absolute terms of the Bill of Rights, but within some limited area
determined by a balancing of the purposes of the Immigration Act60
and the Bill of Rights.6 1 However, if the Supreme Court is of the
opinion that the subjection of an immigrant to the threat of a sus-
pended deportation order for a long period of time and its eventual
implementation against him without him being given an opportunity
to know in what respects he has misbehaved since the deportation
order was suspended does not constitute a violation of his rights to
"life, liberty, security and the right not to be deprived thereof except
by due process of law",62 his right "to be informed promptly of
the reason for his . . . detention", 63 or his right to a "fair hearing",
64
nor effects his "arbitrary detention, imprisonment or exile", 65 it is
nevertheless submitted that the issue is not so clear as to warrant
the complete avoidance of the Canadian Bill of Rights in a case in
which its application was squarely raised by the facts.
THOMAS G. HEINTZMANW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In re The Supreme Court Act Amendment Act, 1964 (B.C.); The A.-G.
of British Columbia v. McKenzie, [1965] S.C.R. 490.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION CONFERRING DIVORCE
JURISDICTION ON LOCAL JUDGES OF SUPREME COURT-WHETHER ULTRA
VIRES AS INTERFERING WITH FEDERAL POWER UNDER B.N.A. ACT, 1867,
ss. 91, 92, 96, 101.
This case was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada under
section 37 of the Supreme Court Act' from a unanimous decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appea 2 which held, on a reference
under the Constitutional Questions Determination Act,3 that section 3
60 Supra, footnote 2.
61 Supra, footnote 38. For a review of the balance that the American
courts have sought to achieve between the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and the American Immigration laws, see Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law (1930), published under the auspices of the Association
of American Law Schools, Book IV, pp. 739 et seq.
62 Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, footnote 38, s. 1(a). See I. R. Rand,
Except by Due Process of Law (1960-63), 2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 171.
Canadian Bill of Rights, supra, footnote 38, s. 2(c).
64 Ibid., s. 2(e).
65 Ibid., s. 2(a).
* Thomas G. Heintzman, A.B. (Harvard), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member
of the 1966 graduating class.
I R.S.C. 1952, c. 259.
2 (1965), 50 W.W.R. 193, sub nom. Re Constitutional Questions Determina-
tion Act; Re Supreme Court Act Amendment Act, 1964. Also reported in
(1965), 48 D.L.R. (2d) 447, sub nom. Reference Re Supreme Court Act Amend-
ment Act, 1964 (B.C.).
3 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 72.
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of the British Columbia Supreme Court Act Amendment Act, 1964,4
was ultra vires the Legislature of the Province. Section 3 of the
amending Act would have changed section 18 of the Supreme Court
Act of British Columbia5 to read as follows:
(1) Judges of the several County Courts are Judges of the Court for
the purpose of their jurisdiction in actions in the Court, and in the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction may be styled "Local Judges of the Supreme
Court of British Columbia," and have in all causes and matters in the
Court, subject to Rules of Court, power and authority to do and perform
all such acts and transact all such business, in respect of causes and
matters in and before the Court, as they are by Statute or Rules of Court
in that behalf from time to time empowered to do and perform.
(2) Without thereby limiting the generality of the provisions of subsec-
tion (1), it is declared that the jurisdiction of the Judges of the several
County Courts as Local Judges of the Supreme Court extends to the
exercising of all such powers and authorities, and the performing of all
such acts, and the transacting of all such business as may be exercised,
performed, or transacted by the Supreme Court or any Judge thereof
under the provisions of
(dl) the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act as amended by the Divorce
Jurisdiction Act and by the Marriage and Divorce Act of Canada; ...
Two questions were raised by the original reference; the first
being whether the legislation was of a type included in the subject
matter set out in section 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act, which reserves
legislation relating to "The Administration of Justice in the Province,
including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provin-
cial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including
Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts" to the Provincial legis-
latures, or whether it was legislation in respect of marriage and
divorce, which is a field reserved exclusively to the Dominion Parlia-
ment under section 91(26) of the B.N.A. Act. The second question
was, whether the legislation infringed the appointing power of the
Governor-General of Canada, to whom, by section 96 of the B.N.A.
Act, is given the sole authority to appoint Superior, District, and
County Court Judges.
When the reference came to the Court of Appeal for British
Columbia before Bird C.J.B.C., Davey, Sheppard, Norris, and Tysoe
JJ.A. the learned justices were unanimous in holding that the amend-
ment in question was ultra vires the Provincial legislature. All except
Bird C.J.B.C., who concurred with Tysoe J.A., gave separate judg-
ments with slight variations in reasons, though not in result.
The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeal, Taschereau C.J.C., Cartwright,
Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Hall, and Spence JJ. concurring in the
reasons given by Ritchie J., and Judson J. giving separate reasons
concurring in result.
This note will discuss the two points raised in the reference and
the appeal under the headings (i) The Interplay of ss. 92(14) and
4 S.B.C., 1964, c. 56.
5 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 374.
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91(26) of the B.N.A. Act, and (ii) The Conflict with Section 96 of
the B.N.A. Act.
The InterpZay of ss. 92(14) and 91(26) of the B.N.A. Act
On this question the British Columbia Court of Appeal refused
to come to any definite conclusions as a whole although Sheppard
J.A. decided definitely that the provincial legislature has jurisdiction
to constitute a divorce court and to designate the offices within it
and their jurisdiction. Because of his decision on the s. 96 point
Norris J.A. did not feel constrained to make a determination on
this matter, while Davey J.A. indicated that he could see no problem
arising because the legislation in question merely authorized officers
of the Supreme Court to exercise a jurisdiction pre-existing in the
Court.
Tysoe J.A., in a comprehensive judgment, also arrived at the
conclusion that he was not bound to decide the question. He did,
however, examine the arguments of counsel on the point, explaining
that opinion has mainly drifted into two lines of cases extending back
to 1888. One line held that the province may validly legislate to
create courts having jurisdiction in divorce; the other, that the
province has no power within s. 92(14) to do so since "all matters
concerning divorce are expressly reserved to the Dominion Parlia-
ment.",
6
The cases holding that the provincial legislature may validly deal
with procedure in divorce matters begin with the decision in Regina
v. Bush,7 where, in considering the propriety of the appointment of
magistrates by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, it was held that
s. 92(14) confers "upon the Provincial Legislatures the right to
regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected with the
administration of justice in the Provinces, including the appointment
of all the Judges and Officers requisite for the proper administration
of justice in the widest sense, reserving only the procedure in criminal
matters."8 The only curbs superimposed upon this power by the
B.N.A. Act are to be found in sections 91(27) (Criminal Procedure),
96 (Appointment of Superior, District, and County Court Judges),
100 (Payment of Salaries of s. 96 Judges), and 101 (Establishment
of additional Courts by the Dominion). This view was referred to
with approval in Sheppard v. Sheppard9 where it was stated that
until the Dominion creates a divorce court ousting provincial juris-
diction, the provincial legislature is quite competent to move in the
field. Further, this view has been clearly accepted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Reference re Adoption Act, etc.10 where Duff C.J.
6 Scott v. Scott (1891), 4 B.C.R. 316, at p. 319 (C.A.).
7 (1888), 15 O.R. 398; 4 Cart. 460 (C.A.).
8 Ibid., at pp. 403-404, per Street J.
9 (1908), 13 B.C.R. 486, at p. 519. Approved by the J.C.P.C. in Watts v.
Watts, [1908] A.C. 573, at p. 579.
10 [1938] S.C.R. 398, at p. 408.
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quoted, with obvious approval, from the judgment of Street J. in the
Bush case."
The other line of cases descends from the B.C. case of Scott v.
Scott12 which was applied in several subsequent decisions.13 The Scott
case held provincial legislation conferring an appellate jurisdiction in
divorce on the Supreme Court of B.C. to be ultra vires as an infringe-
ment on the federal power in divorce and matrimonial causes, com-
menting that "since Confederation all matters concerning divorce are
expressly reserved to the Dominion Parliament."1 4 However, while
refusing to decide the question positively, Tysoe J.A. indicated that
there are several cases criticising Scott, making particular reference
to the Manitoba case of Bils7and v. Bilsland'5 where the Manitoba
Court of Appeal firmly refused to follow the B.C. authority, Perdue
C.J.M. declaring that in his view "the learned Judges . .. did not
pay sufficient regard to sub-head No. 14 of sec. 92 of the B.N.A.
Act."'1 6 From his judgment it seems clear that Tysoe J.A. would have
held in favour of the provincial power had he felt himself bound to act.
In the Supreme Court of Canada the judgment of Sheppard J.,
finding that the Legislature of British Columbia may validly legislate
to constitute, maintain, and organize a court having jurisdiction in
divorce, was approved and affirmed.'7 The case of Watts v. Watts18
which was decided by the Privy Council in 1908 was taken as con-
clusive of the point, Judson J. stating that since that case "there has
been no doubt that the Supreme Court of British Columbia has this
jurisdiction." In Watts it was the decision of the Privy Council that,
on British Columbia's entry into Confederation in 1871, the body of
received law included the English law relating to divorce as set out
in the Act of 1857, the Supreme Court of the Province then possessing
jurisdiction under the Act. No federal statute having been passed to
affect the law or the power of the court, such law and jurisdiction
have subsisted to the present day.
The writer of this note is of the opinion that the view favoured
by Sheppard and Tysoe JJ.A. and affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada is unimpeachable. In a province which has divorce legislation
comparable to the Act of 1857 there must, prima facie, exist a right,
in a proper case, to the remedy of divorce. In the field of marriage
and divorce the Dominion has an absolute and all-inclusive right to
legislate. The federal authorities have, however, never exercised the
entire scope of that general power. This then is the classic example
of an "un-occupied field." The province, by turning to s. 92(14), may
11 Supra, footnote 7, at pp. 403405.
12 (1891), 4 B.C.R. 316 (C.A.).
13 E.g. Broum v. Brown (1909), 10 W.L.R. 15, 14 B.C.R. 142 (C.A.); Tjtler
v. Jamieson, [1935] 3 W.W.R. 510, 50 B.C.R. 263 (C.A.).
14 Emphasis added.
15 [1922] 1 W.W.R. 718, 31 Man. R. 422 (C.A.).
16 Ibid., at p. 720.
17 [1965] S.C.R. 490, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 623, at p. 495 (S.C.R.), 628 (D.L.R.).
18 [1908] A.C. 573 (P.C.).
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take steps to create a means of enforcing the rights conferred on
the subject, i.e., establish a court of appropriate jurisdiction or, allow
the case to be brought before an existing court of proper gravity.
Indeed as Viscount Haldane said in the case of Board v. Board:
Had the Legislature of the Province enacted that its tribunals were not
to give effect to the right which the Dominion Parliament had conferred
in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction, a serious question would have
arisen as to whether such an enactment was valid....
If the right exists, the presumption is that there is a Court which can
enforce it, for if no other mode of enforcing it is prescribed, that alone
is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the King's Courts of justice. In order
to oust jurisdiction, it is necessary, in the absence of a special law exclud-
ing it altogether, to plead that jurisdiction exists in some other Court.19
Such power in the province would be displaced if the Dominion
pursued a more complete implementation of s. 91(26) by means of
s. 101. As is stated in Power on Divorce:
Sec. 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act gives the provinces authority over the"administration of justice in the province, including the constitution,
maintenance and organization of the provincial courts, both of civil and
criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those
courts." The provincial courts and legislatures have therefore acted on
the view that the procedure in divorce actions is, at least in the absence
of dominion legislation, a matter within the competence of the provincial
legislature. (Reference re Divorce Jurisdiction (1952), 29 M.P.R. 120;
2 D.L.R. 513; 4 Abr. Con. (2nd) 683 (C.A.)). There is little doubt, however,
but that procedural provisions could be included in a dominion divorce
Act as necessarily incidental and ancillary to the main objects thereof
as they are in the Bankruptcy Act.20
The Conflict with Section 96 of the B.N.A. Act
On the second question of the reference the unanimous answer
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal was that the proposed amend-
ment infringed s. 96 of the B.N.A. Act, which provides:
96. The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior,
District, and County Courts of each Province, except those of the Courts
of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Davey J.A. found that although the province has the power to
confer the jurisdiction, the Local Judges were not validly appointed
Superior Court Judges under s. 96. Sheppard J.A. enlarged upon a
similar finding by pointing out that Local Judges were limited,
according to the cases, 21 to hearing matters in chambers. The exercise
of jurisdiction in divorce is a part of the judicial power of a Superior
Court. Therefore, the legislation in question purported to confer upon
Local Judges a power quite foreign to their normal and usual juris-
diction; a power at the very least analogous to that of a Superior
Court Judge, and in the particular field under consideration, a power
identical to it. As such, the legislation is ultra vires the province
19 [1919J A.C. 956, at p. 962 (P.C.).
20 Power on Divorce (1964), 2d. ed., (J. D. Payne, ed.), p. 2.
21 Wakefield v. Turner (1898), 6 B.C.R. 216; Brigman v. McKenzie (1897),
6 B.C.R. 56; MacKintosh v. MacKintosh (1961), 35 W.W.R. 288 (B.C.S.C.).
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since, by s. 96, only the Governor General may appoint Superior
Court Judges.22
In his approach, Norris J.A. appeared to say that this type of
legislation falls either under s. 92(14) or under s. 96. That is, the
appointments may be valid under either section, depending upon the
"pith and substance of the legislation". Agreeing with the reasoning
of Tysoe J.A. he found that the "pith and substance" of the amend-
ment did not relate to the administration of justice within the province
and declared the amendment to be ultra vires the Provincial Legis-
lature because it encroached upon the powers of the Governor General,
given exclusively to him by s. 96.P
In the most comprehensive of the judgments in the case, Tysoe
J.A. pointed out that the issue involved here did not arise from an
attempt to increase or extend the jurisdiction of the County Courts
or their judges per se; nor from the appointing of County Court
Judges to be local Judges of the Supreme Court since such appoint-
ments are in fact made by the Governor General. He stated that the
true problem was whether a provincial legislature has the power to
confer full Supreme Court jurisdiction in one branch of the law upon
one who is not a judge of the Supreme Court. After reviewing the
relevant cases24 the learned Judge concluded their purview to be that
if the province appoints someone to an office, which office is endowed
with a jurisdiction approaching or coinciding with that of a s. 96
Judge, then, notwithstanding any right of appeal or any limitation
to a specified branch of the law, the appointment is ultra vires as
offending s. 96. In this case, he found that the powers given to the
Local Judges were unlike any they had possessed before and were
identical to those of a Supreme Court Judge dealing with divorce and
matrimonial causes, a situation tantamount to their appointment to
22 Sheppard, J.A. was applying the tests laid down in Labour Relations
Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, [1948] 2 W.W.R. 1055, [1949]
A.C. 134:
(a) whether the board exercised a judicial power;
(b) if so, whether in that exercise it was a tribunal analogous to a
superior, district, or county court and, therefore, within section 96
of the B.N.A. Act:
and, Attorney General for Ontario and Display Service Company v. Victoria
Medical Building Ltd., [1960] S.C.R. 32:
(a) Is the jurisdiction conferred an original one (or does the matter arise
by way of reference)?
(b) Is it of a type normally foreign to the appointee's office?
(c) Is the jurisdiction analogous or identical to that of a section 96
Judge?
(d) Does the appointee have a power of final adjudication?
23 See the case of Gallagher v. Lynn, [1937] A.C. 863, 106 L.J.P.C. 161, at
p. 870 (A.C.), per Lord Atkin.
24 Colonial Investment and Loan Co. v. Grady (1915), 8 W.W.R. 995, 24
D.L.R. 176; Labour Relations Board of Sask. v. John East Iron Works, supra,
footnote 22; Reference re Adoption Act etc., [1938] S.C.R. 398; Toronto Cor-
poration v. York Corporation and Attorney-General for Ontario, [1938] 1
W.W.R. 452, [1938] A.C. 415; Attorney-General for Ontario and Display Ser-
viwes Co. v. Vitoria Medical Buildings, Ltd., supra, footnote 22; Attorney.




be Judges of that Court. Hence the legislation invaded the s. 96
appointing power.
In the Supreme Court of Canada the views taken by the members
of the Court of Appeal were totally rejected. Ritchie J. speaking for
the majority adopted the attitude that the legislation was not con-
cerned with conferring jurisdiction "upon persons" but with "defining
the jurisdiction of courts".
The Provincial Legislature is by virtue of the provisions of s. 91(26) of
the B.N.A. Act precluded from making substantive changes in the law
of divorce as it existed in British Columbia at the time when that Province
entered into Confederation, but the impugned legislation does not in my
opinion create any substantive right or make any changes in the law or
jurisdiction in that regard. The right to grant a divorce in British Colum-
bia remains vested in the Supreme Court as it previously did and the
effect of the new legislation is limited to reorganizing the administration
of justice in that Court by allocating jurisdiction under the Divorce and
MatrimoniaZ Causes Act... to courts presided over by Local Judges of
the Supreme Court appointed by the Governor-General .... 25
This, he points out, is a valid exercise of provincial power under
section 92 (14).
In his reasons, the learned judge also disposes of two other
objections to the legislation which were voiced in the Court of Appeal.
The first was that Local Judges of the Supreme Court are authorized
by the legislation to preside over courts exercising the jurisdiction
of superior courts, but that as County Court Judges and as Local
Judges they have not been appointed in accordance with section 99
of the B.N.A. Act which guarantees security of tenure to superior
court judges. Section 99 reads as follows:
The Judges of the Superior Courts shall hold office during good behaviour,
but shall be removeable by the Governor-General on Address of the Senate
and House of Commons.
In answer, Ritchie J. states that in his opinion, so long as the
Local Judges are appointed by the Governor-General "during good
behaviour", it does not matter that the terms of their apppointments
are limited to the periods during which they are Judges of the County
Court.
[Tihe provisions of section 92(14) empower the provincial legislature
when reorganizing the courts of the Province to allocate jurisdiction
in divorce and matrimonial causes to a court presided over by a judge
who is so appointed.26
The second objection was ably stated by Davey J.A. the Court of
Appeal:
The letters patent of the Governor-General appointing the several County
Court Judges to be Local Judges of the Supreme Court are not valid
appointments of superior Court Judges under s. 96, since the Supreme
Court Act, passed by the Provincial Legislature specifies who the Local
Judges shall be and thereby in effect requires the Governor-General to
appoint the County Court Judges to be the Local Judges, or to make no
appointment at all, instead of leaving the Governor-General free to
exercise his power at large, subject only to the provisions of the Judges
Act, as s. 96 intends.27
25 Supra, footnote 17, at p. 496 (S.C.R.), 628 (D.L.R.).
26 Ibid., at p. 499 (S.C.R.), 631 (D.L.R.).
27 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 449 (D.L.R.).
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Ritchie J. distinguishes the present case from the leading case
of Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada28
which lies at the basis of the contention. In that reference, legislation
of the Province of Ontario authorizing the Lieutenant-Governor to
assign certain judges of the High Court to be judges of the Court
of Appeal, and to designate certain judges to hold the office of
Chief Justice of Ontario and of the High Court, was held to be ultra
vires as inconsistent with section 96. The distinction he makes is one
between "the power to designate or appoint individual judges of the
Superior and County Courts which is vested in the federal authority
and the power to define the jurisdiction of the courts over which those
judges are to preside, which in civil matters is exclusively within
the provincial field". The British Columbia legislation, he finds,
represents the exercise of a power of the latter variety.
Judson J., in a separate opinion, also thought this case "widely
different" from A.-G. for Ontario v. A.-G. for Canada29. Moreover,
he had no problem whatsoever in finding that there is no conflict
at all with section 96. The Local Judges can have complete control
over the trial in divorce actions in their capacity as Local Judges;
it is still the Supreme Court that is functioning. The fact that Local
Judges have never before exercised such complete control over trials
is not relevant.
It should be noted that Judson J. was prepared to go further and
hold
... that the Province of British Columbia is competent to empower the
County Courts to exercise this jurisdiction and that no constitutional
limitation would arise from s. 96 of the B.N.A. Act, if the Province were
to choose to frame its legislation in this way.30
From the above outline it may readily be seen that, in relation
to the section 96 question, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
and the Supreme Court of Canada adopted widely divergent
approaches to the problem and achieved diametrically opposite results.
The opinion of the learned members of the Court of Apppeal may be
summarized in the following terms. Because legislation of British
Columbia had made divorce a matter for superior courts, an attempt
by the Province to give the same or similar jurisdiction to anyone,
other than those persons lawfully appointed by the Governor-General
to be superior court judges constitutes an appointment of such judges
not in accordance with section 96 of the B.N.A. Act. It matters not
that the persons upon whom the Province confers the jurisdiction
are already Federal appointees. The Province is as much forbidden
to empower a Local Judge of the Supreme Court to exercise the full
jurisdiction of a Supreme Court Judge as it is to appoint the chair-
man of a Provincial board to be a superior, district or county court
judge by vesting him with the same jurisdiction and function as his
federally appointed colleague.
28 [19251 A.C. 750.
29 Ibid.
30 Supra, footnote 17, at p. 502 (S.C.R.), 625 (D.L.R.).
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The answer of the Supreme Court to this approach is that the
legislation under reference does no more than to re-organize the
administration of justice in the Province: a valid exercise of the
power granted under section 92(14). The legislature is not appoint-
ing anyone to anything by merely defining the jurisdiction of courts.
This view is expressed clearly in a statement made by Ritchie J.31
He points out that in the Adoption Act, John East Iron Works,
and Display Services cases32, which had been used as the basis for
attacking the legislation here under reference, attempts had been
made to confer jurisdiction on courts presided over by Provincial
appointees, whereas in the present case, jurisdiction is being con-
ferred on courts to which the Governor-General has appointed judges.
In the former cases, the provincially appointed officials were precluded
from exercising the "section 96 court" jurisdiction conferred by
reason of the origin of their appointments. Here, however, there is
no impropriety in the appointments. It is for the Province and the
Province alone to define the jurisdiction of provincial courts presided
over by federally appointed judges. As has been stated by Strong, J.
in In re County Courts of Britisk Columbia
33
... if the jurisdiction of the courts is to be defined by the provincial
legislatures that must necessarily also involve the jurisdiction of the
judges who constitute such courts.
Conclusions
The answer given by the Supreme Court to the first question of
the reference, as to whether the legislation was of a type included
by section 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act, was clear and unambiguous.
The Province may validly legislate in respect of procedure, but not
substantive law, in divorce matters. The creation and maintenance
of courts having jurisdiction in divorce is a procedural matter and
included under section 92(14). This decision is consistent with the
highest authority and puts the most logical construction on sections
92 (14) and 91 (26).
If reference is had merely to the B.N.A. Act it will be seen that
those procedural matters not to be allowed to the provinces under
section 92 (14) are specifically excepted. Indeed, it was thought neces-
sary to withhold the power over criminal procedure with definite and
unequivocal words in two places: section 91 (27) and section 92 (14).
The power over procedure in divorce is nowhere mentioned specific-
ally, and should perforce fall under section 92(14), unless the
Dominion takes clear steps under section 91 (26) by means of section
101. Although the point has not really been in question since Watts
v. Watts34 was decided in 1908, this decision was necessary to
quiet all debate.
31 Ibid., at p. 497 (S.C.R.), 629-630 (D.L.R.).
32 In re The Adoption Act, supra, footnote 24; Labcour Relations Board
of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, supra, footnote 22; Attorney-
General for Ontario and Display Services (o. v. Victoria Medical Building Ltd,.
supra, footnote 22.
33 (1893), 21 S.C.R. 446, at p. 453.
34 Supra, footnote 9.
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In its decision on the section 96 question the Supreme Court has
specifically rejected the "traditional" approach employed in the Dis-
play Service case.35 That approach is not overruled here, but is im-
plicitly confined to cases where provincially appointed boards and
tribunals are endowed with jurisdiction usual to section 96 courts.
However, the Provinces have the power to enact legislation re-
distributing jurisdiction among section 96 courts. Indeed, it even
appears that when jurisdiction is redistributed among section 96
courts (as between Superior Courts and County Courts),36 the power
lies solely in the provincial legislatures. In view of the decision on
the first question of the reference this is not surprising. If the Province
may create a section 96 court to handle divorce, then surely it may
redistribute divorce jurisdiction among section 96 courts once they
are created.
Because of the factual similarity between the Dispay Service
case37 and the present reference it is tempting to apply the tests laid
down in that case. In Dispay Service the Court was dealing with an
attempt to confer on Masters "all the jurisdiction, powers and
authority of the Supreme Court [of Ontario] to try and dispose of"
certain mechanics' lien actions. The Supreme Court responded by
stating that there are two questions which it should ask itself. First,
what is the nature of the jurisdiction conferred, and secondly, is
the apppointee given a power of final adjudication. In fine, the first
query is broken down into three constituent parts. Is the jurisdiction
conferred an original one (or do matters before the appointee arise
by way of reference)? Is the jurisdiction of a type normally foreign
to the appointee's office? Is the jurisdiction analogous or identical to
that of a section 96 Judge? If the answer to all of the questions is
"Yes" then it at once becomes apparent that the appointee is being
given the jurisdiction, function, and office of a section 96 Judge and
must be appointed by the Governor-General in order validly to exer-
cise his attendant duties.
In this case, the Local Judges are indeed given the jurisdiction,
function, and office of section 96 Judges. Their "saving grace" is
that first, they are already officers of a superior court, and secondly,
they are in fact appointed by the Governor-General. Thus, they are
not excluded from fulfilling the duties charged to them by the
Province.
The jurisdiction of the court in which a Local Judge sits and
therefore the jurisdiction which he exercises, is a matter for the
provincial legislatures under section 92(14). Only his appointment
is a matter for the Governor-General.
M. J. COOMBSO
35 Supra, footnote 22.
36 See the opinion of Judson 3. in the final paragraph of his judgment,
supra, footnote 17, at p. 502 (S.C.R.), 625 (D.L.R.).
37 Supra, footnote 22.
* M. J. Coombs, B.Sc. (Toronto), LL.B. (Osgoode), is a member of the
1966 graduating class.
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